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I. INTRODUCTION

At the time of European settlement, the territory now occupied by the fortyeight contiguous United States contained approximately 221 million acres of
wetlands.' Because these resources were considered throughout our nation's
development as "swampy lands that bred diseases, restricted overland travel,
impeded the production of food and fiber, and generally were not useful for
frontier survival," they were aggressively filled and drained to make way for
more productive uses, resulting in a net loss of over half of that area.2 Recently,
as science has given us a greater understanding of the important function of these
wetlands in the context of the overall health of our nation's waters, pressure has
mounted to preserve them.! With this in mind, Congress passed the Clean Water
Act (CWA), one of the highlights of which is section 404, a permitting system
for those who wish to fill or drain wetlands for productive use.4
For over thirty years, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps),
the agency charged with section 404 oversight, has interpreted the jurisdictional
parameters of the CWA to give it regulatory power "to the maximum extent
permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution."' Recently,
however, the Supreme Court has reduced the extent to which the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Corps may regulate wetlands. Beginning with
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers
(SWANCC) 7 in 2001, the scope of regulatory power began to recede from its
high-water mark.' Ultimately, in 2006, Rapanos v. United States saw the
Supreme Court invalidate the Corps' section 404 regulations as they pertained to
wetlands adjacent to non-navigable waterways.
1. Thomas E. Dahl & Gregory J. Allord, History of Wetlands in the Coterminous United States, United
States Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 2425, available at http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/
WSP2425/history.htnl (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Id. (stating that "[a]bout 103 million acres remained as of the mid-1980's").
3. See Mark Squillace, From "Navigable Waters "to "Constitutional Waters": The Future of Federal
Wetlands Regulation, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 802-09 (2007) (listing as some of the recognized functions
of wetlands: flood prevention; carbon sinks; wastewater treatment; housing biologically diverse plant and
animal species; and recreation).
4. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001).
5. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (ordering the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to promulgate new jurisdictional guidelines which reflect the congressional
intent to regulate to "the maximum extent possible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution").
6. See generally Clean Water Act §§ 1251-1387 (granting enforcement jurisdiction over CWA's various
programs to either the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the Environmental Protection Agency); Squillace,
supra note 3, at 799 ("In three decisions over the course of twenty years, the Supreme Court has expressed
increasing skepticism that the phrase 'navigable waters' supports the Corps' broad claim of jurisdictional
authority.").
7. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
8. See Samuel Bickett, The Illusion of Substance: Why Rapanos v. United States and its Resulting
Regulatory Guidance do not Significantly Limit Federal Regulation of Wetlands, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1032, 1034
(saying that SWANCC "narrowed the outer limits of the CWA's coverage").
9. See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (holding Army Corps of Engineers
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Unfortunately, the only thing that the fractured 4-1-4 decision made clear
was the invalidity of the Corps' thirty-year-old jurisdictional regulations.'o The
decision left wide open to interpretation the question of exactly which wetlands
would continue to receive protection under the CWA and, as will be discussed
later in this Comment, that question remains unanswered." Something must be
done to eliminate confusion on the part of both regulatory agencies and
individual landowners who wish to utilize their land by filling or dredging it.
Exactly what that solution should be is a matter of great debate.
This Comment asserts that, in order to maintain the maximum amount of
protection under the CWA, the inclusive approach of the Rapanos dissent holds
the answer. By promulgating regulations that include waters falling under either
the Rapanos plurality's test or Justice Kennedy's concurring "significant nexus"
test, and relying on the deference which Justices Roberts and Breyer seem to
offer in their separate opinions, the EPA and Corps can restore the predictability
that both they and the parties potentially responsible for section 404 permits
require.
Part II of this Comment gives a brief overview of the CWA and, more
specifically, the often litigated section 404 at issue in Rapanos." Part II includes
the disputed language and stated intent of the CWA, as well as the now invalid
regulations under which the Corps has operated since 1975." Part III will briefly
examine the history of Supreme Court interpretation of section 404's reach,
culminating with the divisive Rapanos decision. Part IV will examine the
subsequent case law and discrepancies therein, which highlight the need for a
uniform standard of application. Part V discusses the interim guidelines
published jointly by the EPA and Corps, which provide the current guidance in
applying the CWA in the field. Part V examines some of the problems created by
the confusion and some ideas for remedies. Finally, Part VI concludes that the
action necessary to ensure comprehensive wetland protection is the codification
by the EPA and Corps of the "either/or" approach from Justice Stevens' Rapanos
dissent.
II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND SECTION 404
In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments, collectively known as the Clean Water Act. " Congress stated goals
"to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
jurisdiction to be too broad and formulating a two-part test for future jurisdiction).
10. See id. (noting that the plurality and Justice Kennedy, as the fifth vote, remanded the cases to the
Sixth Circuit to determine jurisdiction based on new criteria).
11. See infra Part 111.C (discussing the five separate opinions written in Rapanos, three of which lead to
different jurisdictional analysis).
12. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001).
13. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2009).
14. Clean Water Act, §§ 1251-1387.
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Nation's waters" and to "eliminat[e water pollution] by 1985[,]" and the CWA
created two basic permitting programs." One, created by section 402, is the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. 6 The EPA oversees this
program, which regulates waste discharges from point sources into waters." The
other permitting program created by section 404, regulates discharges of dredged
or fill material." This program, overseen by the Corps, will be the focal point of
this Comment.
The CWA defines its scope by requiring a section 404 permit to discharge
dredge or fill material into any "navigable waters," later defined in the Act as
"waters of the United States."' 9 It is the choice of the phrase "navigable waters"
in the Act, and the Corps' interpretation of that phrase, which has led to the
jurisdictional controversy that continues today. While the Corps initially read
"navigable waters" narrowly,20 a 1975 D.C. Circuit Court decision concluded that
Congress had "asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the
maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution[,]"
and the court required the Corps to broaden the scope of regulation.2' Since those
judicially mandated revisions were made, the Corps has broadly defined
"navigable waters" as "intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams" that are used by
interstate travelers or in interstate commerce, non-navigable tributaries of the
same, and "wetlands adjacent to" the aforementioned waters.22 This extensive
interpretation of section 404 jurisdiction has generated the most controversy.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 404

A. Riverside Bayview and the Early DeferentialApproach
Initially, the Supreme Court answered challenges to the Corps' jurisdiction
with the traditional deferential approach articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2 Under the doctrine now referred to as
"Chevron deference," when a statute is ambiguous, a court will generally defer to
the expertise of an administrative agency to which enforcement of a statute has
15. Id. § 1251(a).
16. Id. § 1342.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 1344.
19. Id. §§ 1344(a), 1362.
20. See Bradford C. Mank, Implementing Rapanos-Will Justice Kennedy's Significant Nexus Test
Provide a Workable Standardfor Lower Courts, Regulators, and Developers?, 40 IND. L. REV. 291, 300-01
(2007) (stating that the Corps initially defined the CWA's jurisdiction as "'the broadest possible definition of
actually and potentially navigable waters"').
21. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
22. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2009).
23. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of
deference to administrative interpretations.").
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been delegated, unless the agency's interpretation of that statute can be shown to
be "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 24 The Court gave
25
this deference in the first case of the trinity of CWA cases.
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., a unanimous Supreme

Court held the Corps' jurisdiction stretched to wetlands adjacent to larger,
navigable bodies of water.26 Granting deference to the agency's interpretation, the
opinion states: "[T]he evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of
water quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps
to interpret the term 'waters' to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more
conventionally defined."27 Importantly, the Court in Riverside Bayview
considered the functionality of the adjacent wetlands in its decision to hold the
agency's interpretation as rational." Using language directly from the
congressional statement of intent in the CWA, the Court found that water quality
and ecosystem function were intimately connected, and that "'integrity' . . . refers
to a condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems [are]
maintained." 29 This acknowledgement of wetlands' functionality would, however,
soon give way to a more literalist interpretation.
B. SWANCC and the Retreatfrom Deference

SWANCC put an end to the expansion of the Corps' jurisdiction under the
CWA and introduced language that would ultimately place limits on it.o In 1986,
the Corps promulgated a "migratory bird rule," which sought to regulate all
wetlands and waters that served as a habitat for migratory birds, even when
remote from navigable waters." In a 5-4 decision, over the dissent's calls for
continued agency deference, the majority held that the existence of a "significant
nexus" between the navigable waterway and an adjacent wetland was required in
order for the Corps to exercise permitting authority." Deemphasizing the
importance of functionality relied on in Riverside Bayview, the Court held that it
was this "significant nexus" that guided the decision, and which was missing in

24. Id.; see Mank, supra note 20, at 304.
25. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos are often referred to as the
"trinity" of CWA cases in the Supreme Court.
26. 474 U.S. 121, 131.
27. Id. at 133.
28. Id. at 134-35.
29. Id. at 132; see also Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001) (stating that the goal of the
CWA was "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters").
30. See generally Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159 (2001) ("Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress'
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result . . . this is a far cry, indeed, from the
'navigable waters' . .. to which the statute by its terms extends.").
31. See Mank, supra note 20, at 302-03 n.120 (explaining the "Migratory Bird Rule" contained in the
preamble of 1986 Corps regulations).
32. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-68.
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the facts of SWANCC.' The movement that began in SWANCC-away from
functionality and deference and toward literalism and limitation-culminated in
the Rapanos decision.
C. The FracturedRapanos Decision
In Rapanos, the Court dealt with facts distinct from the prior two cases of the
trinity. Granting certiorari to a pair of Sixth Circuit cases, the Court considered
whether wetlands that "lie near ditches or man-made drains that eventually empty
into traditional navigable waters, constitute 'waters of the United States"' within
the meaning of the CWA." The ensuing "train wreck of a decision" failed to
produce a definitive answer to the question and has led to confusion and mixed
application in circuit and district courts ever since. 16 With five separate opinions,
three separate tests were forwarded to provide guidance on remand as to whether
the Corps had permitting jurisdiction over the filled wetlands in question." This
Section will examine both the plurality and concurring opinions, but will focus
on Justice Stevens' dissent, which is a useful mechanism in determining
jurisdiction post-Rapanos.
1. The PluralityOpinion
In his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia rejects the purposivist approaches of
both Justice Kennedy's concurrence and Justice Stevens' dissent." Justice Scalia
focused on the plain meaning of the words of the statute, using his trusted 1954
edition of Webster's New International Dictionary as an interpretive tool. 9
Centering in on the inclusion of the phrase "the waters" rather than simply
"waters" in the language of the CWA, Scalia concluded that "the waters" refers
to water "found in streams and bodies forming geographical features such as
oceans, rivers, and lakes . . . ."4 He also reasoned, based on dictionary

definitions, that these bodies were necessarily "only relatively permanent,

33. Id. at 167.
34. See Mank, supra note 20, at 302-03 (stating that the Court in Riverside Bayview had taken a
deferential approach which "emphasized the importance of hydrological and biological interactions ... [,"
while in SWANCC, it determined that the relationship to navigability was still important, as the word was
included in the CWA).
35. Id. at 729.
36. See Mark A. Ryan, New Supreme Court Clean Water Decision: Here We Go, 24 NAT. RES. & ENV'T
48, 48 (2009) (referring to the Rapanos decision as a "train wreck").
37. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (noting opinions from Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Stevens).
38. See Mank, supra note 20, at 306 (referring to the methodology of Justice Scalia as textualist and the
methodology of Justices Stevens and Kennedy as purposivist).
39. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732.
40. Id. at 732.
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standing or flowing bodies of water[]" seemingly eliminating from jurisdiction
temporal or intermittent features.4 1
Based on this analysis, the plurality developed a two-part test to be used in
determining jurisdictional wetlands.42 This test requires that: (1) the adjacent
channel contain a water of the U.S. (a relatively permanent body of water
connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and (2) there be a
continuous surface connection to the adjacent water, making it difficult to
determine where the "water" ends and the "wetland" begins.43 The plurality
advocated this limitation as a way to countermand the regulatory agencies' broad
interpretation of the statute, which the plurality felt had "stretched the term
'waters of the United States' beyond parody."" The new interpretation is a return
to the intent of the CWA and within recognizable parameters of the Constitution.
It is not, however, the standard by which future CWA jurisdiction is determined.
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence-The "SignificantNexus"
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, took issue with both the plurality
and dissenting opinions.45 In what has emerged as the seminal opinion from
Rapanos, he re-introduced the concept of the significant nexus between wetlands
and used it to reconcile the holdings from the prior two cases of the trinity.46
Kennedy agreed with the plurality's assertion that Congress had intended the
Corps to regulate waters that fall outside of the traditional definition of
"navigable," but harshly criticized the limitations placed upon them by the
plurality. 47 Calling the opinion "without support in the language and purposes of
the Act or in our cases interpreting it[J" Kennedy asserted that the plurality
interpretation "makes little practical sense in a statute concerned with
downstream water quality."48 Commentators attribute this appreciation of the
interconnectedness of the hydrological cycle, even regarding ephemeral bodies,
to Kennedy's western roots, speculating that this background accounted for his
inclusive reading of the Act.49
Justice Kennedy categorically rejected two of the key findings of the
plurality. First, he rejected the idea that the term "navigable waters" encompasses

41. Id.
42. Id. at 742
43. Id.
44. Id. at 734.
45. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. Id.; Mank, supra note 20, at 317.
47. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy says the plurality opinion is
"unduly dismissive of government interests" and "makes little practical sense in a statute concerned with
downstream water quality." Id. at 769, 777.
48. Id. at 768-69.
49. See Squillace, supra note 3, at 836 ("Kennedy, a westerner, was especially critical of the plurality's
failure to appreciate the ephemeral nature of many major river systems in the west.").
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only relatively permanent bodies of water; and second, that the CWA was
intended to protect only waters bearing a continuous surface connection to such
waters.5 Kennedy gave the Los Angeles River, which he described as "more like
a dry roadway than a river[,]" as an example of how counterintuitive the plurality
decision is." Although dry for most of the year, the river "periodically releases
water volumes . .. powerful and destructive . . . ." when it rains, illustrating the

need for the CWA jurisdiction over it.52 The plurality's two-part test would
exclude this river from Corps' jurisdiction, a result which Kennedy found
improper and contrary to the purpose of the CWA."
While Justice Kennedy was much more in agreement with the dissent, he felt
that their interpretation of the CWA ignored a key term of the Act"navigable."" Writing that "the word 'navigable' in the Act must be given some
effect[,]" Kennedy rejected the dissent's broad deference to the Corps'
interpretation." Under the long-recognized Corps guidelines, navigability held
relatively little value when determining CWA applicability. Kennedy's opinion
would require "that the Corps demonstrate a specific ecological nexus between
the wetlands it seeks to regulate and the navigable waters" warranting that
regulation."
Justice Kennedy cited the Corps' rationale for the CWA regulation of nonadjacent wetlands before outlining the precise test for "significant nexus."58 It
was with these functions in mind that he posited:
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the
statutory phrase "navigable waters," if the wetlands, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as "navigable." When, in contrast,
wetlands' effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they

50. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 768 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Justice Kennedy calls the "two limitations on
the Act ... without support in the language and purposes of the Act or in our cases interpreting it." Id.
51. Id. at 769.
52. Id.
53. See id. ("[T]he plurality seems to presume that such irregular flows are too insignificant to be of
concern in a statute focused on 'waters' .....
54. Id. at 778.
55. Id. at 779; see also Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159, 172 ("[It is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give it no effect
whatever.").
56. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2009) (noting that the word "navigable" is never used in the list of waters
subject to CWA regulation).
57. Mank, supra note 20, at 319.
58. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2)) ("[W]etlands
can perform critical functions related to the integrity of other waters-functions such as pollutant trapping,
flood control, and runoff storage.").
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fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term "navigable
waters." 9
While Justice Kennedy's test leaves some terms open to interpretation
("significantly affect", "speculative", and "insubstantial", etc.), it has emerged as
the test that most circuit and district courts use as their standard for
interpretation.6
Additionally, Justice Kennedy suggested that the responsible agencies could
streamline the jurisdictional determination process and sidestep costly litigation
by regulating comparable wetlands on a regionally consistent basis.'
Recognizing that, in individual regions, similarly situated waters will have
similar downstream effects, Kennedy suggested that it would be appropriate "to
presume covered status for other comparable wetlands in the region."62 Therefore,
the case-by-case analysis that many feared would be the result of the opinion
could be drastically reduced.
3.

The Dissent-An Inclusive Approach

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens asserted that the Riverside Bayview
holding "squarely control[led]" the outcome of the cases in Rapanos.63 Stevens'
dissent paid much more heed to the stated purpose of the CWA, reiterating the
Act's intent to "'restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters."' With that purpose in mind, Stevens pointed
out that "wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters
preserve the quality of our Nation's waters."6 Therefore, the Corps' decision to
treat such wetlands as within the meaning of the CWA was "a quintessential
example of the Executive's reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision[,]"
which warranted Chevron deference-the approach the Court took in Riverside
Bayview. 6 Ultimately, Stevens argued, if deference was not to be given the
agencies' regulations, then either wetlands possessing a significant nexus to
navigable waters or wetlands meeting the plurality's two-part test should be
eligible to be regulated by the Corps.

59. Id. at 780.
60. See generally Margaret N. Strand, Wetlands Law in 2009-Still in Flux, SP036 ALI-ABA 309, 325334 (2009) (giving a case-by-case listing of post-Rapanosjurisdictional determinations made by lower courts).
61. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 787 (citing Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001)).
65. Id. at 788.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 810.
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4. Offers of Deference?
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer also authored opinions in Rapanos;
Roberts' a concurrence and Breyer's a dissent. While these opinions get very
little exposure in the analysis of the case, for the purposes of this Comment, they
are significant, as they both point to the availability of significant deference to
future regulations promulgated by the enforcement agencies.'
Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that five years prior, in SWANCC, the
Court had rejected the expansive jurisdiction over wetlands that the Corps had
exercised for the prior twenty-five years, recommending that the rules be
rewritten.70 The agency, in conjunction with the EPA, had initiated rulemaking
procedures with the goal of developing "'proposed regulations that will further
the public interest by clarifying what waters are subject to CWA jurisdiction and
affording full protection to these waters through an appropriate focus of Federal
and State resources consistent with the CWA.""' Roberts seems to intimate that
had that rulemaking gone beyond the preliminary stages, the agency would have
received greater deference in the plurality's decision.72 Pointing out that "[t]he
proposed rulemaking went nowhere[,]" rather than "providing guidance meriting
deference under our generous standards .

.

. [,]" the Chief Justice says that the

failure to promulgate new regulations' direct "upshot .. . is another defeat for the
agency."
Justice Breyer echoed the same offer of deference, but did so in agreement
with the dissent.7 4 Breyer asserted that, based upon Congress' stated purpose in
enacting the CWA, there was not meant to be any requirement of a "significant
nexus" as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Despite the new requirement, Breyer
pointed out the plurality's decision "left the administrative powers of the Army
Corps of Engineers untouched." Breyer urged the Corps to write new
regulations defining this significant nexus as broadly as possible, reminding his
colleagues on the Court that they "must give those regulations appropriate
deference."77 His dissent and Chief Justice Roberts' concurrence indicate that
supporters of both Scalia's plurality opinion and Stevens' dissent encourage the
agencies to promulgate new regulations and offer significant deference in
subsequent application.

68. Id. at 757 (Roberts, CJ., concurring); id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 757 (Roberts, CJ., concurring); id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 757 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
71. Id. at 758 (quoting 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (2003)).
72. See id. ("[T]the Corps and EPA would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate in developing some
notion of an outer bound to the reach of their authority[,]" had the effort to promulgate new rules continued.).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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IV. SUBSEQUENT LOWER COURT APPLICATION AND THE CORPS AND EPA
RESPONSE

A. Lower Courts Try to Apply Rapanos
In the wake of Rapanos, district and circuit courts continue to struggle with
the question of which test to apply when considering Corps' jurisdiction over a
disputed wetland. In all, seven courts of appeal have faced the decision of which
test emerged from Rapanos as controlling. 8 Those courts applying Kennedy's
significant nexus test are in the clear majority, but others have taken different
approaches.79 The first circuit court to approach the question was the Seventh
Circuit.80 In looking for guidance as to which opinion was controlling, the court
relied on the doctrine from Marks v. United States.8 ' The Marks doctrine holds
that, in the case of a fractured Supreme Court decision where a majority of
Justices agree on the outcome but not the grounds for it, "lower court judges are
to follow the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would have
assented if forced to choose."82 Stating "[t]he plurality Justices thought that
Justice Kennedy's [opinion] ... was narrower than their own . . . [,]" the Seventh

Circuit Court based its opinion on that principle." Because "any conclusion that
Justice Kennedy reaches in favor of [jurisdiction] in a future case will command
the support of five Justices (himself plus the four dissenters), and in most cases in
which he concludes that there is no federal authority he will command five votes
(himself plus the Rapanos plurality) . . . ." his concurrence sets the least common
denominator." Therefore, the Seventh Circuit determined, that Kennedy's
proposed standard would apply on remand.
The Ninth Circuit followed suit. 6 Once again invoking Marks, the court
agreed with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and applied Justice Kennedy's
significant nexus test.87 The court added that Justice Kennedy's test reaffirmed
the holding of Riverside Bayview-that wetlands adjacent to navigable
waterways were covered by the Act-as "by virtue of the 'reasonable inference

78. Damien M. Schiff, Post-Rapanos Fallout, TRENDS (ABA Section of Environment, Energy, and
Resources Newsletter), Nov./Dec. 2009, at 12.
79. See generally Strand, supra note 60 (listing all circuit and district court decisions regarding CWA
jurisdiction since Rapanos).
80. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).
81. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
82. Id. at 193; Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 725.
85. Id.
86. See generally N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a
significant nexus between a rock quarry into which sewage had been discharged and wetlands adjacent to a
navigable river); see also S.F. Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 481 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying Justice
Kennedy's standard and finding no significant nexus despite actual adjacency to the navigable water).
87. N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 995.
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of ecologic interconnection,' assertion of jurisdiction 'is sustainable under the
Act by showing adjacency alone.'"' The Eleventh Circuit placed even more
emphasis on Marks when remanding a criminal case for interpretation under the
significant nexus test.89 Noting "Marks does not direct lower courts interpreting
fractured Supreme Court decisions to consider the positions of those who
dissented[," the Eleventh Circuit held that the only standard which could be
considered was Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus."'
Other circuits disagree with the interpretation of Rapanos through Marks.9'
Declining to defer to the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court had been moving away from the Marks doctrine toward one articulated in a
newer precedential case.92 The court found the appropriate test to be one of
"analyzing the points of agreement between plurality, concurring, and dissenting
opinions to extract the principles that a majority has embraced."" The First
Circuit noted that "[t]he cases in which Justice Kennedy would limit federal
jurisdiction are not a subset of the cases in which the plurality would limit
jurisdiction[J" and that certain sets of facts would lead to "a bizarre outcomethe court would find no federal jurisdiction even though eight Justices (the four
members of the plurality and the four dissenters) would all agree that federal
authority should extend .

. .

.

Characterizing Justice Stevens' "either/or" test as

"simple and pragmatic," the First Circuit remanded the case with the instruction
to "do exactly as Justice Stevens has suggested" 9 -that is, to find CWA
jurisdiction over sites in question if they meet either the plurality test or the
significant nexus test.9 The Eighth Circuit,1 the District of Connecticut," and the
Western District of Kentucky have all subsequently applied the First Circuit's
approach."

88. Id. at 1000.
89. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007).
90. See id. (addressing the position that other circuit courts had adopted which would allow CWA
jurisdiction under either the plurality opinion in Rapanos or the Kennedy "significant nexus" test).
91. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the Marks doctrine "has
proven troublesome in application" and "require[s] scrutiny").
92. Id. at 65 (citing Nichols v. U.S., 511 U.S. 738).
93. Id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 685 (1994)).
94. Id. at 64.
95. Id. at 64, 66.
96. Id. at 66.
97. See United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2009) ("We find Judge Lipez's reasoning in
Johnson to be persuasive, and thus we join the First Circuit in holding that the Corps has jurisdiction over
wetlands that satisfy either the plurality or Justice Kennedy's test.").
98. See Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226 (D.
Conn. 2007) (calling the First Circuit's Johnson analysis "common-sense").
99. See United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 940, 944-47 (D. Ky. 2007) (finding the wetlands at
issue were covered by CWA under either test because they affected chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of a navigable river as well as having a continuous surface connection).
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At least one district court judge has refused to even attempt to answer the
jurisdictional question.'m Saying that "I am so perplexed by the way the law
applicable to this case has developed that it would be inappropriate for me to try
it again[,]" the judge wrote an opinion reassigning the case at bar to another
*101
judge.
The one commonality all subsequent cases visited by lower courts have is
that the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to grant certiorari to any of
them.'" Cases applying both the First Circuit (significant nexus or the plurality
test) approach and Seventh Circuit (significant nexus) have been denied certiorari
in the last two sessions, indicating that if there is going to be clarification of the
issue, it will need to come from a source different than the Court. 03 In fact, the
Supreme Court has denied petitions for writ of certiorari from five of the seven
circuit court decisions addressing the jurisdictional question that Rapanos left
unanswered.'"' It would appear that the Court has placed the onus of clarifying
jurisdiction on either Congress or the agencies, intending to revisit the issue only
after new regulations are written.
B. The Corps and EPA Attempt to Provide a Solution
The agencies involved in the fray have also weighed in on the post-Rapanos
jurisdictional quandary, issuing a joint memorandum in 2007, including
amendments in 2008, of guidelines (Guidelines) for developers and enforcement
officers alike.'o The Corps/EPA memorandum, issued in response to Rapanos
and "in recognition of the fact that EPA regions and Corps districts need
guidance to ensure that jurisdictional determinations . . . are consistent with the
decision ... [,]" provides some basic structures for determining when jurisdiction
should be found.'" The Guidelines provide a listing of the water features over
which the agencies will always assert jurisdiction, those that are never included
within the meaning of the CWA, and those that require "fact-specific analysis."'o
The Guidelines plainly state that that the test to be used in the analysis is whether
"they have a significant nexus with traditional navigable water."'m The
100. Juliet Eilperin, EPA Enforcement is Faulted, WASH. POST, July 8, 2008, available at
http://www.washington post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/07/AR2008070702418_pf.html (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
101. Id.
102. Schiff, supra note 78, at 13.
103. See id. ("It ... seems unlikely that the Court will address the question in the near future.").
104. Id.
105. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Jurisdictional Determination Memorandum I (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.usace.arny.mil/CECWIDocuments/cecwo/reg/cwa-guide/cwajuris_2decO8.pdf
available at
[hereinafter DeterminationMemorandum] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (issuing guidance in light
of the Rapanos decision to field officers regarding when CWA jurisdiction is available).
106. Id. at 3.
107. See generally id. (listing three basic categories of CWA jurisdiction).
108. Id. at 8.
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Guidelines proceed to give instructions on how to apply the significant nexus
standard, including a fairly exhaustive list of the factors to be considered.'9
The agencies' application of the significant nexus test focuses on "the
ecological relationship between tributaries and their adjacent wetlands, and their
closely linked role in protecting the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of downstream traditional navigable waters.""o The Guidelines instruct agencies
to evaluate the nexus relationship based on determinations of certain hydrologic
factors (such as volume, duration, and frequency of flow of water between both
the wetland in question and the tributary as well as between the tributary and the
navigable water it feeds) and ecological factors (such as potential of tributaries to
carry pollutants to navigable waters and the potential of a wetland to trap
floodwaters)."' These determinations are then documented and added to a
database of the wetlands that fall under CWA jurisdiction and those that do not."2
While these guidelines have proven somewhat workable by the agencies
administering them for the past two years, they are not a definitive answer to
completely clarify difficult questions of jurisdiction.
Critics of the agency guidance charge that it "not only fails to correctly
interpret the Court's opinions, but is itself rife with striations of political leanings
that improperly interpret important aspects of the opinions and further limit the
Act's ability to protect waters.""' Calling it "both under-inclusive and overinclusive, and unnecessarily so on both counts[,]" critics point out that by
applying the significant test to direct tributaries of navigable waters, the agencies
are eliminating categorical protection for those bodies that the Court did not
question in its decision." 4 They also point out that because Rapanos was not
concerned with section 402 point source programs, the joint guidance creates
different jurisdictional analyses for different CWA programs."' This
development is both "legally indefensible" and "potentially a practical
nightmare" which has holders of section 402 permits claiming exemption from
the permitting process."'
Further, critics point out that the Guidelines fail to address Justice Kennedy's
recognition that similarly-situated wetlands can be presumptively lumped
together once one has been shown to contain the requisite significant nexus.'
The Guidelines fail to recognize the importance of aggregating the impacts of

109. Id. at 10-12.
110. Id at 10.
111. Id. at 10-12.
112. Id. at 11.
113. James Murphy & Stephen M. Johnson, Significant Flaws: Why the Rapanos Guidance
Misinterpretsthe Law, Fails to Protect Waters, and Provides Little Certainty, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J.
431, 433 (2007).
114. Id. at 446.
115. Id.at447.
116. Id. at 447-48.
117. Id at 450.
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multiple tributaries, an important aspect of the significant nexus test, which
examines the effect of the tributary system as a whole, rather than as individual
parts."' In light of such criticisms, the Guidelines are obviously not the answer to

all jurisdictional questions presented by the Rapanos decision.
V. WHAT ABOUT A CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT TO THE
CLEAN WATER ACT?

The joint EPA/Corps Guidelines present a good, albeit incomplete,
introductory process for CWA jurisdictional analysis. An initial problem is that,
due to questions surrounding judicial enforcement, the Guidelines have not
eliminated much of the uncertainty regarding CWA jurisdiction. The Guidelines
do not carry the authoritative weight of law, as they have not been codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations. This confusion leads to difficulties and delays in
both the permitting and enforcement process."' Further, some already permittedfacilities have begun to assert that in light of Rapanos and the inconsistencies in
the Guidelines, they no longer need to maintain their permits. 20 Lack of certainty
has created an obvious vacuum when it comes to solid guidance for CWA
jurisdiction, but the solution is not as readily apparent.
While the agencies and Congress debate the proper solution to the problem,
the nation's waters are left unprotected. In March 2008, the EPA's Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance released a memo detailing just how
drastic an effect Rapanos is having on CWA enforcement. According to the
memo, the Court's decision and the subsequent guidelines led EPA regional
offices to cite "judicial uncertainty" as the reason to not pursue potential
violations in over 300 cases.122 Additionally, the "guidance instructs federal
officials to focus on the 'relevant reach' of a tributary, which translates into a
single segment of a stream." 23 This isolation of a small tributary "'ignores
longstanding scientific ecosystem and watershed protection principles critical to
meeting the goals . .. ."' of CWA.124 In all, the memo estimated that the Rapanos
decision and confusion surrounding the subsequent guidelines had "'negatively
affected approximately 500 enforcement cases . . . .'" in only a nine month
118. See id. at 450-51 (examining the results of an American Rivers report which showed that individual
wetlands considered in isolation only account for "a scintilla" of the various benefits of the headwater system as
a whole).
119. See CLEAN WATER AcTION, Overview: Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009, http://www.
cleanwateraction.org/print/714 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (asserting that enforcement was not
pursued for over 300 CWA violations due to uncertainty about jurisdiction, and that the time to receive a permit
has increased by up to three months).
120. Id. ("[S]everal are arguing that because of the Supreme Court decisions they no longer require
permits which impose limits on their pollution levels.").
121. Eilperin, supra note 100.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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span.'2 To meet the purpose of the CWA, either Congress or the administrative
agencies charged with its enforcement must take some sort of action.
Many commentators have championed the need for a congressional
amendment to the CWA in order to eliminate the confusion.126 Most of these
proposed amendments involve a change in the wording of the CWA to reflect the
broad congressional intent behind it by pushing regulation to the outer limits of
the broad powers vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.127
One scholar suggests changing the wording of the CWA to substitute the
phrase "constitutional waters" for the ill-advised "navigable waters" included in
the original.'28 The scholar posits that the original intent of Congress when
enacting the CWA was to extend jurisdiction of the Act as far as the Commerce
Clause would allow, establishing a comprehensive federal program for wetlands
regulation. 29 The unfortunate usage of the phrase "navigable waters" was simply
due to directly lifting language from the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act,
which "focused on activities that might obstruct navigation." 0 In his SWANCC
dissent, Justice Stevens addressed this historical inconsistency by pointing out
the vastly different stated purposes of the two Acts, even though the language of
the earlier was incorporated into the later."' By changing the language very
slightly, Congress could dispel the idea that navigability has anything to do with

the purpose of the CWA.132
Certain members of Congress agree with those who call for an amendment to
the CWA. In 2009, Senator Russ Feingold introduced the Clean Water
Restoration Act. 3 3 The proposed act states that SWANCC and Rapanos have
"resulted in confusion, permitting delays, increased costs, litigation, and reduced
protections for waters of the United States . .. []" and that Congress is the only
entity that can reaffirm the scope of protected waters.'3 The proposed act also
says that "protection of intrastate waters is necessary to restore and maintain the

125. Id.
126. See, e.g,. Squillace, supra note 3, at 801 (proposing the solution of a Congressional amendment
changing the wording of the CWA to substitute the phrase "constitutional waters" for "navigable waters.");
Jenny L. Routheaux, Note, Western Wetlands in Jeopardy After Rapanos v. United States: Congressional
Action Needed to Define "Navigable Waters" Under the Clean Water Act, 8 NEV. L.J. 1045, 1075 (2008)
(positing that the proper solution to the CWA confusion is a congressional amendment clarifying exactly which
waters are subject to CWA jurisdiction; including those that "impact" traditionally navigable waters).
127. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
128. See Mark Squillace, supra note 3 at 801 (noting that substitution of the phrase "constitutional
waters" will have the effect of extending jurisdiction to the maximum allowable constitutional limit).
129. Id. at 814.
130. Id. at 811.
131. S.W. Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 179-80
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Squillace, supra note 3, at 859.
133. Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 787, 111 th Cong. (2009).
134. Id. at 6.
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chemical, physical, and biological integrity of all waters of the United
States[."'" The bill would accomplish all of this by amending the language of
the CWA to replace the term "navigable waters" with the term "waters of the
United States."' This simple change will reaffirm the intent of Congress to
exercise jurisdiction over any waters which have the potential to have a
substantial effect on the interstate commerce.
Supporters hail the bill as a return to the intended scope of the CWA, and
characterize the Court's prior decisions as utilization of unintended legislative
loopholes. 3 Opponents fear that the Congressional amendment to the CWA is an
unauthorized land grab that violates the federalist foundation of the country. 9
Regardless of which characterization is correct, it is unlikely that the bill or
anything resembling it will pass in the immediate future.
A virtually identical bill was introduced in the Senate in the previous
congressional session, along with a companion in the House of
Representatives.'4 Neither of these bills left the committee stages, failing to
garner significant support from Republicans.' 4 ' In fact, since the 1990s it has
become increasingly difficult to pass environmental legislation due to the
partisan nature of the Congress.142 Considered along with the fact that legislation
to clarify the Act's jurisdictional limits failed to get through Congress in 1977,
when the partisan rift was not nearly as pronounced, hopes for a congressional
solution seem to be fading.143 Therefore, an alternative solution will be needed.
VI. NEW FEDERAL REGULATIONS: A MORE LIKELY SOLUTION
Since neither the Supreme Court nor Congress seem inclined to give a
definitive answer of where CWA jurisdiction begins or ends, if the agencies
charged with enforcement of the Act would like to have a clear line delineated,
they will ultimately have to do it themselves. To draw that line properly will
require incorporation of each of the five opinions in Rapanos. The EPA and

135. Id. at 8.
136. Id. at 13.
137. Id.
138. See Clean Water Restoration Act Provides Hope, Apr. 3, 2009, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/trip-van-noppen/clean-water-restoration-a-b_182927.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
139. See Not So Private Property?: Clean Water Restoration Act Raises Fears of Land Grab, Fox .
(Dec. 14, 2009)
NEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/12/14/private-property-clean-water-restoration
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
140. See Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 1870, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing to replace the phrase
"navigable waters" with "waters of the United States" in the Clean Water Act); see also Clean Water
Restoration Act, H.R. 2424, 110th Cong. (2007) (identical to the aforementioned Senate Bill).
141. OpenCongress.org, S-1870 The Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007, http://www.Open
congress.org/bill/1 10-sl870/actions_votes (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
142. Mank, supra note 20, at 346.
143. Id.
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Corps must codify the new set of jurisdictional rules they began to create after
SWANCC, and incorporate definitions from the plurality and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, the fusion of the two opinions by the Stevens dissent, and the
assurances of the Chevron deference from both Chief Justice Roberts'
concurrence and the Breyer dissent.'"
It appears that to be within the mandate the Court issued in Rapanos, the new
regulations will need merely to be a little narrower than the previous set.145 This
new set of regulations could be more inclusive than the plurality's criteria and
still allow the EPA and Corps to expect approval by a majority of the Court.46
While it is an "interesting, but unknowable question" whether members of the
plurality opinion would defer to this new set of regulations, the time and cost of
promulgating the new regulations would undoubtedly cut in favor of at least the
Chief Justice standing behind his offer of "generous" deference.147 The agencies
should begin with the plurality opinion, supplement it with Justice Kennedy's
significant nexus, standardize and maintain record databases, demonstrate
conclusively the aggregate impact of upstream wetlands, and allow similarly
situated regional wetlands to receive consistent coverage.
A. Begin by Codifying the PluralityOpinion
First, the most basic step is to codify the two-part test of the plurality;
making waters that (1) are adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, and (2) have a
continuous surface connection to those waters automatically fall under CWA
jurisdiction.148 This would begin to set forth, in detail, exactly what waters fall
under CWA, as well as eliminate future legal confusion. It would also, in
conjunction with a codification of an expansive definition of "significant nexus,"
provide for the maximum allowable coverage of the CWA, by filling in a slight
gap in coverage left by the significant nexus test.
From a legal perspective, these waters are acknowledged by eight members
of the Court (with the exception of Justice Kennedy) to fall under CWA
jurisdiction. 149 It would take a bizarre turn of events (or a retroactive rewrite of
the 1958 Webster's New American Dictionary) for any of the plurality justices to
abandon their criteria after so explicitly outlining them, and the three remaining
dissenters who joined the Stevens opinion would certainly maintain their stance

144. See supra Part 11.C (discussing the different opinions).
145. Mank, supra note 20, at 323 (hypothesizing that new regulations-slightly narrower than the 1977
version, yet broader than the Rapanos plurality's interpretation-may receive deference).
146. Id.
147. See id. (characterizing the question of Supreme Court deference to a set of regulations narrowed by
SWANCC "interesting but unknowable"); see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts,
CJ., concurring).
148. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006)
149. See id. (the plurality's test); see also id. at 787 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (advising on remand that the
plurality test should be considered as one test of CWA jurisdiction).
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of inclusiveness. "o Therefore, little legal controversy should be expected as a
result of this starting point.
The plurality test is also necessary to the goal of providing the most CWA
coverage allowable. While the significant nexus requirement can and should be
written to only modestly narrow the scope of CWA enforcement, there will be
some gaps left. As pointed out by Judge Lipez of the First Circuit, there are
certain waters which have no significant nexus with a navigable waterway that
do, however, meet the plurality criteria."' Therefore, to be complete and
inclusive, any new regulations will require that waters with a continuous surface
connection to the navigable-in-fact waters they abut are protected per se.152
B. Supplement with the Significant Nexus Test
The next step is to promulgate a set of criteria based upon the significant
nexus requirement. This would provide virtually the same broad protection as the
regulations invalidated by Rapanos, but phrase the jurisdictional parameters in a
more acceptable way. As most tributary wetlands have significant ecological or
hydrological impacts on downstream navigable waters, virtually all wetlands
previously covered by the Corps' regulations will also satisfy the significant
nexus test.'53 From a legal perspective, the agencies should be able to count on at
least five votes from the Court to validate the regulations when they are
inevitably challenged (assuming that Justices Sotomayor and Kagan are
consistent with their predecessors).15 4
Writing the significant nexus test into the federal regulations could begin
with codifying much of the existing joint Corps/EPA Guidelines. The agencies
should write into the Code of Federal Regulations every step that the Guidelines
give for determining when there is a significant nexus, include every minute
detail that could demonstrate a chemical or hydrological connection to
downstream navigable water, and the exact amount that is needed to show any
sort of detrimental environmental effect. The result will be a very clear definition
of a significant nexus and how one is determined. It seems that, if the promised
deference is granted, this level of specificity would withstand the legal challenges
that will no doubt follow closely on the heels of publication.

150. Justice Stevens, who authored the dissent and Justice Souter, who joined it, have since retired.
Their respective replacements, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, have, at the time of writing, yet to weigh in on
the issue.
151. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006) (pointing out that in the case of a
small stream or brook with a surface connection, the plurality's criteria are met, while Justice Kennedy's are
not, leading to a "bizarre outcome" of no jurisdiction under the significant nexus test, even though eight justices
would support it).
152. Id.
153. Mank, supra note 20, at 348.
154. The four dissenting Justices plus Justice Kennedy would support CWA jurisdiction when a
significant nexus exists.
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The first order of business under the Guidelines is to determine if a tributary
has adjacent wetlands.' In the case of section 404 permits, those wetlands are
the subject of permitting disputes, so they can safely be assumed to exist. Perhaps
the converse of the listed first step is to determine if the wetlands under
consideration abut a tributary of navigable water. This will acknowledge the
requirement of both the plurality and Justice Kennedy that the word "navigable"
in the Act be given some meaning, 6 as well as provide a simple prerequisite to
determining if a significant nexus exists.
The Guidelines continue, as should the new codified rules, by making the
next step in jurisdictional determinations evaluation of the significant nexus. By
examining the "closely linked role in protecting the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable waters[,]" the
enforcement agencies determine if permits are necessary.' By focusing on this
connection and the downstream effects of proposed projects, the agencies will
stay true to the stated goal of the Act.'
Agencies are to use available hydrologic information, including but not
limited to "gauge data, flood predictions, historic records of water flow,
statistical data, [and] personal observations/records . . . [,]" to examine this
connection.'" They may also consider the physical characteristics of the wetlands
and the tributaries, including existence of a reliable ordinary high water mark,
"shelving, wracking, water staining, sediment sorting, and scour[," to
supplement this information.' Additionally, significant nexus analyses will look
at contextual factors of the wetlands and tributaries, "including size of watershed,
average annual rainfall, average annual winter snow pack, slope, and channel
dimensions."
Significant nexus determinations must also continue to consider the
functionality of the wetlands, regardless of narrow dictionary definitions.162 More
than any analysis of parts-per-million of substances or gallons transferred
between the water bodies, the functionality will provide for extensive protection
of wetlands. Factors such as capacity to filter pollutants or to capture and regulate
the amount of flood waters that enter tributaries will significantly expand the
CWA coverage, while remaining within the constraints of Justice Kennedy's

155. DeterminationMemorandum, supra note 105, at 10.
156. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (the plurality's test); see also id. at 778
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the word "navigable" in the CWA had to be given some meaning).
157. DeterminationMemorandum, supra note 105, at 10.
158. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001) (Its stated goals are "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters" and to "eliminat[e]... water pollution by
1985.").
159. DeterminationMemorandum, supra note 105, at 10
160. Id.at 10-ll.
161. Id. at 11.
162. Id.
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test.'6 ' Therefore, agencies could look to not just to the waters which are released
from a wetland to a tributary, but the waters that are not released.
Biology is also a strong factor to determining that a significant nexus exists,
and the guidance recognizes that. Even though SWANCC invalidated CWA
protection based solely on the temporary presence of migratory birds, other
biological factors can show a direct link between the wetlands in question and
downstream navigable waters.'" For instance, the wetlands might "transfer
nutrients and organic carbon [matter] vital to support downstream foodwebs." 6 1
They may also provide spawning grounds "for recreationally or commercially
important species in downstream waters . . . ."'6 By codifying these factors

among those to be considered in determining a significant nexus, the
jurisdictional reach of the CWA might even be expanded to situations where a
hydrological connection simply doesn't exist. For this reason, many in the
plurality would dispute this factor's availability as part of a significant nexus
determination, but Justice Kennedy explicitly included biological integrity as one
of the factors to be considered.' 7
When all of this data is gathered, the agencies will examine it to determine
whether the possible effects are speculative and insubstantial, or if real
connections can be made. 6 Far from attempting to prove a negative, it would
seem that if the agencies can show that just one of their codified factors exists in
more than an anomalous manner, the significant nexus test is satisfied. This will
ultimately have the effect of allowing agency jurisdiction over nearly every
wetland.'"
C. Standardize and Maintain Administrative Data
In the interest of avoiding unnecessary jurisdictional disputes and costly
litigation, the Corps' newly promulgated rules should maintain the administrative
record documentation requirement from the interim guidelines. 70 Current
guidelines instruct regional offices, in the course of making jurisdictional
determinations, to maintain records of all information and bases for making those

163.

Id.

164. See generally Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
159 (2001) (holding that the intermittent presence of migratory waterfowl could not be the basis for CWA
jurisdiction).
165. See Determination Memorandum, supra note 105, at II ("[M]acroinvertebrates present in
headwater streams convert carbon in leaf litter making it available to species downstream.").
166. Id.
167. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. See id. at 780 (saying that when effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they "fall
outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term 'navigable waters."').
169. See Mank, supra note 20, at 348 ("[M]ost tributary wetlands have significant ecological or
hydrological impacts on navigable waters.").
170. DeterminationMemorandum, supra note 105, at 11 (explaining the interim guidelines).
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determinations.' 7 1 If records of agency decisions regarding jurisdictional
decisions are diligently maintained, and include the required information, most
suits challenging jurisdiction could be summarily decided. Either the
requirements were met or they were not, and there should be voluminous data on
record to support either decision. District and circuit courts could summarily
determine whether the data is reliable and render a decision.
D. Aggregate Impacts and Similarly Situated Wetlands
In light of the reasonable criticisms, the guidance should be supplemented
with a few additional provisions to completely address the significant nexus test
and ensure comprehensive coverage of all of the nation's waters. To begin, the
aggregate impact of upstream wetlands must be addressed and codified. This
would protect the headwater streams and associated wetlands that might fail to
meet the significant nexus test when considered in isolation. 7 2 This aggregate
approach would have the support of at least five members of the Court, as along
with the dissent, Justice Kennedy realized its importance. 7 1
The new rules should also contain a provision allowing wetlands similarly
situated and within the same protection region as those which have already been
recognized as jurisdictional to be presumptively under CWA jurisdiction.
Supported by Justice Kennedy's concurrence, 174 this presumption would be
helpful to both agencies making jurisdictional decisions and courts faced with
challenges to those decisions. It would also be the final step in maintaining the
broad jurisdiction of the CWA over American waters while remaining within the
framework laid out in Rapanos.
VII. CONCLUSION

While the best way to ensure broad CWA protections over our nation's
waters is certainly to have Congress affirm its broad intent, today's political
climate is simply not conducive to that response. In order to maintain the
previous levels of protection, the agencies responsible for enforcing the Act, the
EPA and the Corps, need to promulgate and publish a set of rules consistent with
recent Supreme Court rulings. In writing the regulations to recognize that
virtually all wetlands in the country have some sort of ecological or hydrological
"significant nexus" with the navigable waterways downstream, the agencies
should be able to rely on generous deference offered to them by both the
concurring and dissenting opinions in the definitive, yet convoluted Rapanos
decision.
171.
172.
173.
174.
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